Overview
Product details compiled from public sources, each with a citation.
- Description
- Tools that red team AI models at build time and apply a runtime firewall against prompt injection, data leakage, and rogue MCP servers.1
- Deployment
- Self-hosted1
- Status
- Acquired2agent
- Acquisition
- Acquired by A10 Networks, announced 2026-06-15. It now operates as a standalone product.2agent
Matrix Coverage
Where this product defends, by asset class and NIST CSF function. The Coverage column shows whether each asset is Primary, Secondary, or Adjacent to what the product does. The table omits empty rows and columns.
| Asset class | Protect | Detect | Coverage | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Primary | 3 | ||
| AI Model | Protect: Not covered | Primary | 3 | |
| Runtime AI Data | Primary | 3 |
Framework Relevance
These frameworks include controls relevant to the asset classes TrojAI defends. This is an editorial inference from the AI Defense Matrix asset-level crossmap, not a statement that TrojAI implements these controls or is certified against them.
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| Framework | Asset class | Relevant controls |
|---|---|---|
| NIST IR 8596 | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Agents as deployed artifacts (orchestration view; see AI Agent Identities row for the principal view); system prompts and templates |
| AI Model | Models; Algorithms (model configuration) | |
| Runtime AI Data | Prompts (runtime); inference data | |
| CSA AI Controls Matrix | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Application and Interface Security; Supply Chain Management |
| AI Model | Model Security; Governance, Risk and Compliance | |
| Runtime AI Data | Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management; Application and Interface Security | |
| ISO 42001 | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | A.6 AI system life cycle; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems |
| AI Model | A.6 AI system life cycle; A.10 Third-party and customer relationships; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems | |
| Runtime AI Data | A.7 Data for AI systems; A.8 Information for interested parties | |
| Google SAIF | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Secure the AI supply chain; application and pipeline security; agent orchestration controls |
| AI Model | Protect the AI model; ensure model integrity, provenance, and weight security | |
| Runtime AI Data | Expand AI red-teaming; runtime input and output safety; prompt defense | |
| SANS Critical AI Security Guidelines | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Secure Agentic Systems and AI Autonomy Controls (defined function scope; execution isolation; API and function-call gating); Limit Model Behavior (focused functionality; access controls outside the model) |
| AI Model | Conventional Security Controls (protect model parameters with least privilege, encryption at rest, runtime obfuscation, and trusted execution environments); Data/Model Engineering Controls (adversarial training; alignment and fine-tuning); AI Supply Chain Management (public-model caution; transfer-attack exposure) | |
| Runtime AI Data | Model I/O Handling (sanitize, validate, and filter inputs and outputs; segregate user and system prompts; multilayered prompt-injection defense); Conventional Security Controls (protect augmentation and RAG data with vector-store access controls and validation); Data Minimization and Obfuscation (limit sensitive prompt content; context-window management); Limit Model Behavior (AI guardrails) | |
| MITRE ATLAS | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection; AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak; AML.T0016 Obtain Capabilities (malicious plugins) |
| AI Model | AML.T0043 Craft Adversarial Data; AML.T0024 Exfiltration via AI Inference API (subtechniques: AML.T0024.001 Invert AI Model and AML.T0024.002 Extract AI Model); AML.T0018 Manipulate AI Model (integrity and backdoor) | |
| Runtime AI Data | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection; AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak; AML.T0056 Extract LLM System Prompt (system prompt leaks as inference data; the AI Coding and Orchestration Tools row owns it as configuration) | |
| OWASP AI Exchange | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Development-time threats: agent framework supply chain; runtime threats: plugin abuse, prompt injection via tools |
| AI Model | Development-time and runtime model threats: model inversion, extraction, evasion, poisoning | |
| Runtime AI Data | Input threats: prompt injection, adversarial inputs, evasion; runtime threats: RAG poisoning, memory tampering | |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | LLM01 Prompt Injection; LLM05 Improper Output Handling; LLM07 System Prompt Leakage; LLM10 Unbounded Consumption |
| AI Model | LLM03 Supply Chain; LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning; LLM09 Misinformation | |
| Runtime AI Data | LLM01 Prompt Injection; LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure; LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses; LLM05 Improper Output Handling | |
| OWASP Agentic Security Top 10 | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation; ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE); ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication; ASI08 Cascading Failures; ASI10 Rogue Agents |
| AI Model | ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (model provenance, weights, and dynamic loading) | |
| Runtime AI Data | ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning; ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack (via prompt injection in runtime inputs) |
Provenance
Last sourced 2026-07-16.
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Sources
- TrojAI homepage
- A10 Networks acquires TrojAI
- TrojAI by A10 Networks product page
- “Detect runs continuous, agent-led red teaming against your AI models and agents, simulating single-turn, multi-turn, and agentic attacks to uncover unsafe behavior before deployment, with findings mapped to OWASP, MITRE, and NIST frameworks.”
- “Defend blocks prompt injection, jailbreaking, data leakage, and toxic content in real time, enforcing security policies across every AI agent and application in production, and streaming insights into your existing SIEM, SOAR, and ticketing platforms.”
- “Discovers rogue or misconfigured MCP servers and tools, enforces policy on agent-to-model-to-server communications, and blocks malicious or suspicious MCP traffic in real time.”
Changelog
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Refreshed source links and quotes against the current vendor pages.
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Recorded the A10 Networks acquisition, announced 2026-06-15.
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Added to the catalog from the TrojAI documentation.
Found an error? Corrections are welcome. Suggest an edit.