ThreatLocker Zero Trust AI Control
Overview
Product details compiled from public sources, each with a citation.
- Vendor
- ThreatLocker1agent
- Description
- Endpoint policy layer that limits which files, applications, scripts, and internet destinations AI agents, and the processes they start, can reach.1agent
- Deployment
- Not found1agent
- Status
- Active2agent
Matrix Coverage
Where this product defends, by asset class and NIST CSF function. The Coverage column shows whether each asset is Primary, Secondary, or Adjacent to what the product does. The table omits empty rows and columns.
| Asset class | Identify | Protect | Detect | Coverage | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Primary | 1 | |||
| AI Traffic | Identify: Not covered | Detect: Not covered | Secondary | 1 |
Framework Relevance
These frameworks include controls relevant to the asset classes ThreatLocker Zero Trust AI Control defends. This is an editorial inference from the AI Defense Matrix asset-level crossmap, not a statement that ThreatLocker implements these controls or is certified against them.
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| Framework | Asset class | Relevant controls |
|---|---|---|
| NIST IR 8596 | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Agents as deployed artifacts (orchestration view; see AI Agent Identities row for the principal view); system prompts and templates |
| AI Traffic | AI data flows; APIs; inference endpoints (traffic side); model registries and dataset sources | |
| CSA AI Controls Matrix | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Application and Interface Security; Supply Chain Management |
| AI Traffic | Infrastructure Security; Interoperability and Portability | |
| ISO 42001 | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | A.6 AI system life cycle; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems |
| AI Traffic | A.8 Information for interested parties; A.9 Use of AI systems; A.10 Third-party and customer relationships | |
| Google SAIF | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Secure the AI supply chain; application and pipeline security; agent orchestration controls |
| AI Traffic | Harden and monitor infrastructure; network-level access and egress controls | |
| SANS Critical AI Security Guidelines | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Secure Agentic Systems and AI Autonomy Controls (defined function scope; execution isolation; API and function-call gating); Limit Model Behavior (focused functionality; access controls outside the model) |
| AI Traffic | Conventional Security Controls (authenticate and control access to inference APIs; API key management); Model I/O Handling (rate limiting; egress output filtering); Monitoring (interaction and API-usage logging) | |
| MITRE ATLAS | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection; AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak; AML.T0016 Obtain Capabilities (malicious plugins) |
| AI Traffic | AML.T0057 LLM Data Leakage; AML.T0024 Exfiltration via AI Inference API (network-side observation) | |
| OWASP AI Exchange | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | Development-time threats: agent framework supply chain; runtime threats: plugin abuse, prompt injection via tools |
| AI Traffic | Runtime threats: data leakage via AI egress; network-level access control gaps | |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | LLM01 Prompt Injection; LLM05 Improper Output Handling; LLM07 System Prompt Leakage; LLM10 Unbounded Consumption |
| AI Traffic | LLM10 Unbounded Consumption (cost and rate control); shadow AI egress and output handling | |
| OWASP Agentic Security Top 10 | AI Coding and Orchestration Tools | ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation; ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE); ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication; ASI08 Cascading Failures; ASI10 Rogue Agents |
| AI Traffic | ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation (egress and tool-invocation scope); ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (MCP and tool-registry trust) |
Provenance
Last sourced 2026-10-31.
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Sources
- ThreatLocker Zero Trust AI Control page
- “Decide which applications, scripts, internet destinations, and administrative tools an AI agent can reach, launch, or interact with.”
- “The workflow gets access to approved resources while unrelated files, systems, applications, and internet destinations stay out of reach.”
- ThreatLocker launches Zero Trust AI Control
Changelog
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Added to the catalog from the ThreatLocker product page and press release.
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