Rubrik Agent Cloud
Overview
Product details compiled from public sources, each with a citation.
Matrix Coverage
Where this product defends, by asset class and NIST CSF function. The Coverage column shows whether each asset is Primary, Secondary, or Adjacent to what the product does. The table omits empty rows and columns.
| Asset class | Identify | Protect | Detect | Recover | Coverage | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI-Generated Code | Identify: Not covered | Protect: Not covered | Detect: Not covered | Recover: Covered | Secondary | 1 |
| Runtime AI Data | Identify: Not covered | Protect: Covered | Detect: Covered | Recover: Not covered | Primary | 2 |
| AI Agent Identities | Identify: Covered | Protect: Not covered | Detect: Not covered | Recover: Covered | Primary | 3 |
Framework Relevance
These frameworks include controls relevant to the asset classes Rubrik Agent Cloud defends. This is an editorial inference from the AI Defense Matrix asset-level crossmap, not a statement that Rubrik implements these controls or is certified against them.
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| Framework | Asset class | Relevant controls |
|---|---|---|
| NIST IR 8596 | Runtime AI Data | Prompts (runtime); inference data |
| AI Agent Identities | Agents as autonomous principals; Keys; Integrations and permissions | |
| CSA AI Controls Matrix | AI-Generated Code | Application and Interface Security; Supply Chain Management |
| Runtime AI Data | Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management; Application and Interface Security | |
| AI Agent Identities | IAM; Governance, Risk and Compliance | |
| ISO 42001 | AI-Generated Code | A.6 AI system life cycle |
| Runtime AI Data | A.7 Data for AI systems; A.8 Information for interested parties | |
| AI Agent Identities | A.9 Use of AI systems; A.3 Internal organization; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems | |
| Google SAIF | AI-Generated Code | Secure the AI pipeline; code provenance and supply chain integrity |
| Runtime AI Data | Expand AI red-teaming; runtime input and output safety; prompt defense | |
| AI Agent Identities | Focus on Agents (explicit SAIF section); identity, authorization, and delegation controls | |
| SANS Critical AI Security Guidelines | AI-Generated Code | Model I/O Handling (AI deployment in IDEs: prefer local-only integrations to limit exposure of code, keys, and proprietary data); Governance, Risk, Compliance (regularly test and red-team AI applications before and after deployment) |
| Runtime AI Data | Model I/O Handling (sanitize, validate, and filter inputs and outputs; segregate user and system prompts; multilayered prompt-injection defense); Conventional Security Controls (protect augmentation and RAG data with vector-store access controls and validation); Data Minimization and Obfuscation (limit sensitive prompt content; context-window management); Limit Model Behavior (AI guardrails) | |
| AI Agent Identities | Secure Agentic Systems and AI Autonomy Controls (defined function scope; API and function-call gating; escalation and fallback); Limit Model Behavior (least-privilege focused functionality; human oversight; override capabilities) | |
| MITRE ATLAS | AI-Generated Code | AML.T0010 AI Supply Chain Compromise (hallucinated dependencies and slopsquatting); AML.T0018 Manipulate AI Model (when models embed code-execution backdoors) |
| Runtime AI Data | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection; AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak; AML.T0056 Extract LLM System Prompt | |
| AI Agent Identities | AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation; credential and delegation-chain abuse | |
| OWASP AI Exchange | AI-Generated Code | Development-time threats: insecure code generation, license risk, hallucinated dependencies |
| Runtime AI Data | Input threats: prompt injection, adversarial inputs, evasion; runtime threats: RAG poisoning, memory tampering | |
| AI Agent Identities | Runtime threats: unauthorized agent actions, capability abuse, delegation chain exploitation | |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 | AI-Generated Code | LLM06 Excessive Agency (code execution); insecure or vulnerable code patterns inherited from training data |
| Runtime AI Data | LLM01 Prompt Injection; LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure; LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses; LLM05 Improper Output Handling | |
| AI Agent Identities | LLM06 Excessive Agency; LLM05 Improper Output Handling; unauthorized actions by AI agents | |
| OWASP Agentic Security Top 10 | AI-Generated Code | ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE); ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (hallucinated dependencies and vibe-coding artifacts) |
| Runtime AI Data | ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning; ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack (via prompt injection in runtime inputs) | |
| AI Agent Identities | ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse; ASI10 Rogue Agents; ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation (when tied to agent permissions) |
Provenance
Last sourced 2026-06-10.
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Sources
Changelog
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Refined matrix coverage and primary function.
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Added to the catalog from the Rubrik documentation.
Found an error? Corrections are welcome. Suggest an edit.
Product Strategy and Positioning
You can use the following frameworks to understand the product’s strategy and its competitive positioning. Performing this analysis is outside the scope of the AI Defense Matrix Catalog, but the following guidance can help you with such an assessment.
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Product Strategy
Lenny Zeltser’s Guide to Creating Cybersecurity Products can help you understand key aspects of the product strategy. You can use your AI tool to gather the data and apply this framework.
- Market segment
- Who the product is built for: industry, size, and the persona who evaluates it.
- Go-to-market motion
- How it reaches buyers: top-down sales, bottom-up adoption, or open source.
- Pricing model
- How value is captured: per-seat, consumption, or outcome-based.
- Delivery and operations
- How it is deployed, configured, and maintained, including infrastructure-as-code and API coverage.
- Customer trust
- Certifications, transparency, and supply-chain security a buyer expects from the vendor.
- Ecosystem position
- A point solution, a platform others build on, or a component of a larger platform.
Strategy Defensibility
Ben Vierck’s rubric can help you assess the defensibility of the SaaS product’s strategy against competitive and other market forces. You can use it with your AI tool for a methodical analysis.
- Value delivery
- How much of the value is hard to replicate versus standard software a competitor could rebuild.
- Switching cost
- How costly it is to leave once deployed: integrations, data, workflow, and platform ties.
- Compliance moat
- Whether certifications or regulatory alignment are a durable advantage or table stakes for this buyer.
- Problem complexity
- How hard, adversarial, and fast-moving the underlying problem is to solve well.
- Buyer profile
- Who holds the budget, and how durable that demand is across the market.
- Layer
- Where the product operates: application, model, infrastructure, platform, or identity control plane.
- Proprietary data, content, or IP
- Whether it accumulates data, content, or IP that others would find difficult to replicate.