Overview
Product details compiled from public sources, each with a citation.
- Vendor
- Reco2
- Description
- SaaS security platform that discovers shadow AI tools and AI agents, monitors agent permissions and behavior, and governs generative AI usage across enterprise apps.3
- Deployment
- SaaS4
- Status
- Active2
- Compliance
- SOC 2 Type 2, ISO 27001, ISO 42001, CSA STAR Level 1, GDPR1 (company-level, see Methodology)
Matrix Coverage
Where this product defends, by asset class and NIST CSF function. The Coverage column shows whether each asset is Primary, Secondary, or Adjacent to what the product does. The table omits empty rows and columns.
| Asset class | Identify | Detect | Coverage | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI-Workload Platforms | Detect: Not covered | Primary | 3 | |
| Runtime AI Data | Secondary | 5 | ||
| AI Agent Identities | Primary | 2 |
Framework Relevance
These frameworks include controls relevant to the asset classes Reco defends. This is an editorial inference from the AI Defense Matrix asset-level crossmap, not a statement that Reco implements these controls or is certified against them.
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| Framework | Asset class | Relevant controls |
|---|---|---|
| NIST IR 8596 | AI-Workload Platforms | Containers, microservices, and libraries (AI-specific subset); inference endpoints (platform side) |
| Runtime AI Data | Prompts (runtime); inference data | |
| AI Agent Identities | Agents as autonomous principals; Keys; Integrations and permissions | |
| CSA AI Controls Matrix | AI-Workload Platforms | Infrastructure Security; Threat & Vulnerability Management |
| Runtime AI Data | Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management; Application and Interface Security | |
| AI Agent Identities | IAM; Governance, Risk and Compliance | |
| ISO 42001 | AI-Workload Platforms | A.6 AI system life cycle; A.4 Resources for AI systems |
| Runtime AI Data | A.7 Data for AI systems; A.8 Information for interested parties | |
| AI Agent Identities | A.9 Use of AI systems; A.3 Internal organization; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems | |
| Google SAIF | AI-Workload Platforms | Expand strong security foundations; secure and harden the AI deployment environment |
| Runtime AI Data | Expand AI red-teaming; runtime input and output safety; prompt defense | |
| AI Agent Identities | Focus on Agents (explicit SAIF section); identity, authorization, and delegation controls | |
| SANS Critical AI Security Guidelines | AI-Workload Platforms | Conventional Security Controls (host AI within the existing ISMS; authentication and access controls; encryption at rest); AI Supply Chain Management (local vs. SaaS hosting trade-offs; internal model garden) |
| Runtime AI Data | Model I/O Handling (sanitize, validate, and filter inputs and outputs; segregate user and system prompts; multilayered prompt-injection defense); Conventional Security Controls (protect augmentation and RAG data with vector-store access controls and validation); Data Minimization and Obfuscation (limit sensitive prompt content; context-window management); Limit Model Behavior (AI guardrails) | |
| AI Agent Identities | Secure Agentic Systems and AI Autonomy Controls (defined function scope; API and function-call gating; escalation and fallback); Limit Model Behavior (least-privilege focused functionality; human oversight; override capabilities) | |
| MITRE ATLAS | AI-Workload Platforms | AML.T0010 AI Supply Chain Compromise; AML.T0012 Valid Accounts (platform credential abuse); container and inference-server exploits |
| Runtime AI Data | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection; AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak; AML.T0056 Extract LLM System Prompt | |
| AI Agent Identities | AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation; credential and delegation-chain abuse | |
| OWASP AI Exchange | AI-Workload Platforms | Development-time threats: supply chain attacks, model-platform CVEs, container escape |
| Runtime AI Data | Input threats: prompt injection, adversarial inputs, evasion; runtime threats: RAG poisoning, memory tampering | |
| AI Agent Identities | Runtime threats: unauthorized agent actions, capability abuse, delegation chain exploitation | |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 | AI-Workload Platforms | LLM03 Supply Chain (compromised AI platform components); LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning (via platform) |
| Runtime AI Data | LLM01 Prompt Injection; LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure; LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses; LLM05 Improper Output Handling | |
| AI Agent Identities | LLM06 Excessive Agency; LLM05 Improper Output Handling; unauthorized actions by AI agents | |
| OWASP Agentic Security Top 10 | AI-Workload Platforms | ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (model and tool-platform components); ASI08 Cascading Failures (platform fault propagation) |
| Runtime AI Data | ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning; ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack (via prompt injection in runtime inputs) | |
| AI Agent Identities | ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse; ASI10 Rogue Agents; ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation (when tied to agent permissions) |
Provenance
Last sourced 2026-06-10.
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Sources
- Reco Trust Center
- “ISO/IEC 42001:2023”
- Reco homepage
- “Know exactly what every agent in your environment can access, who owns it, and where the risk is.”
- Reco agentic AI security page
- “Reco Dynamic SaaS Security empowers security teams to identify, assess, and govern generative AI usage across the enterprise”
- Reco application discovery page
- Reco shadow AI discovery use case
- “Reco provides complete visibility into how shadow AI tools access and potentially expose sensitive information.”
Changelog
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Refined matrix coverage.
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Refined matrix coverage.
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Added to the catalog from the Reco documentation.
Found an error? Corrections are welcome. Suggest an edit.