Prompt Security
Overview
Product details compiled from public sources, each with a citation.
- Vendor
- Prompt Security1
- Description
- Runtime GenAI security that screens employee AI use, homegrown LLM apps, and agents for prompt injection, data leakage, and shadow AI, with inline blocking and redaction.1
- Deployment
- SaaS, Self-hosted1
- Status
- Acquired3
- Acquisition
- Acquired by SentinelOne, announced 2025-08-05. It has been folded into the acquirer.2
Matrix Coverage
Where this product defends, by asset class and NIST CSF function. The Coverage column shows whether each asset is Primary, Secondary, or Adjacent to what the product does. The table omits empty rows and columns.
| Asset class | Protect | Detect | Coverage | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI Orchestration Tools | Primary | 1 | ||
| Runtime AI Data | Primary | 1 | ||
| AI Agent Identities | Detect: Not covered | Secondary | 1 |
Framework Relevance
These frameworks include controls relevant to the asset classes Prompt Security defends. This is an editorial inference from the AI Defense Matrix asset-level crossmap, not a statement that Prompt Security implements these controls or is certified against them.
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| Framework | Asset class | Relevant controls |
|---|---|---|
| NIST IR 8596 | AI Orchestration Tools | Agents as deployed artifacts (orchestration view; see AI Agent Identities row for the principal view); system prompts and templates |
| Runtime AI Data | Prompts (runtime); inference data | |
| AI Agent Identities | Agents as autonomous principals; Keys; Integrations and permissions | |
| CSA AI Controls Matrix | AI Orchestration Tools | Application and Interface Security; Supply Chain Management |
| Runtime AI Data | Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management; Application and Interface Security | |
| AI Agent Identities | IAM; Governance, Risk and Compliance | |
| ISO 42001 | AI Orchestration Tools | A.6 AI system life cycle; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems |
| Runtime AI Data | A.7 Data for AI systems; A.8 Information for interested parties | |
| AI Agent Identities | A.9 Use of AI systems; A.3 Internal organization; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems | |
| Google SAIF | AI Orchestration Tools | Secure the AI supply chain; application and pipeline security; agent orchestration controls |
| Runtime AI Data | Expand AI red-teaming; runtime input and output safety; prompt defense | |
| AI Agent Identities | Focus on Agents (explicit SAIF section); identity, authorization, and delegation controls | |
| SANS Critical AI Security Guidelines | AI Orchestration Tools | Secure Agentic Systems and AI Autonomy Controls (defined function scope; execution isolation; API and function-call gating); Limit Model Behavior (focused functionality; access controls outside the model) |
| Runtime AI Data | Model I/O Handling (sanitize, validate, and filter inputs and outputs; segregate user and system prompts; multilayered prompt-injection defense); Conventional Security Controls (protect augmentation and RAG data with vector-store access controls and validation); Data Minimization and Obfuscation (limit sensitive prompt content; context-window management); Limit Model Behavior (AI guardrails) | |
| AI Agent Identities | Secure Agentic Systems and AI Autonomy Controls (defined function scope; API and function-call gating; escalation and fallback); Limit Model Behavior (least-privilege focused functionality; human oversight; override capabilities) | |
| MITRE ATLAS | AI Orchestration Tools | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection; AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak; AML.T0016 Obtain Capabilities (malicious plugins) |
| Runtime AI Data | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection; AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak; AML.T0056 Extract LLM System Prompt | |
| AI Agent Identities | AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation; credential and delegation-chain abuse | |
| OWASP AI Exchange | AI Orchestration Tools | Development-time threats: agent framework supply chain; runtime threats: plugin abuse, prompt injection via tools |
| Runtime AI Data | Input threats: prompt injection, adversarial inputs, evasion; runtime threats: RAG poisoning, memory tampering | |
| AI Agent Identities | Runtime threats: unauthorized agent actions, capability abuse, delegation chain exploitation | |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 | AI Orchestration Tools | LLM01 Prompt Injection; LLM05 Improper Output Handling; LLM07 System Prompt Leakage; LLM10 Unbounded Consumption |
| Runtime AI Data | LLM01 Prompt Injection; LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure; LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses; LLM05 Improper Output Handling | |
| AI Agent Identities | LLM06 Excessive Agency; LLM05 Improper Output Handling; unauthorized actions by AI agents | |
| OWASP Agentic Security Top 10 | AI Orchestration Tools | ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation; ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE); ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication; ASI08 Cascading Failures; ASI10 Rogue Agents |
| Runtime AI Data | ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning; ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack (via prompt injection in runtime inputs) | |
| AI Agent Identities | ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse; ASI10 Rogue Agents; ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation (when tied to agent permissions) |
Provenance
Last sourced 2026-07-17.
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Sources
- Prompt Security platform overview
- “Whether you're evaluating popular AI tools or assessing MCP servers, our platform provides transparent risk scores, parameter breakdowns, and certification status checks.”
- “Monitor, govern, and secure your AI agents”
- SentinelOne to acquire Prompt Security (announcement)
- SentinelOne completes acquisition of Prompt Security
Changelog
-
Refined matrix coverage.
-
Removed the acquirer_slug cross-reference, since SentinelOne has no catalog entry of its own.
-
Enriched from primary sources and recorded the SentinelOne acquisition.
Found an error? Corrections are welcome. Suggest an edit.