JetStream Security
Overview
Product details compiled from public sources, each with a citation.
- Vendor
- JetStream Security3agent
- Description
- AI governance platform that discovers AI agents, models, and MCP servers, binds them to accountable identities, and enforces approved Blueprint designs at runtime.3agent
- Deployment
- SaaS3agent
- Status
- Active3agent
- Compliance
- FedRAMP High1agent (company-level, see Methodology)
Matrix Coverage
Where this product defends, by asset class and NIST CSF function. The Coverage column shows whether each asset is Primary, Secondary, or Adjacent to what the product does. The table omits empty rows and columns.
| Asset class | Govern | Identify | Protect | Detect | Coverage | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI Orchestration Tools | Primary | 3 | ||||
| AI Gateways and Routers | Govern: Not covered | Identify: Not covered | Secondary | 2 | ||
| AI Model | Secondary | 3 | ||||
| Runtime AI Data | Identify: Not covered | Secondary | 3 | |||
| AI Agent Identities | Govern: Not covered | Detect: Not covered | Primary | 3 |
Framework Relevance
These frameworks include controls relevant to the asset classes JetStream Security defends. This is an editorial inference from the AI Defense Matrix asset-level crossmap, not a statement that JetStream Security implements these controls or is certified against them.
Expand Collapse
| Framework | Asset class | Relevant controls |
|---|---|---|
| NIST IR 8596 | AI Orchestration Tools | Agents as deployed artifacts (orchestration view; see AI Agent Identities row for the principal view); system prompts and templates |
| AI Gateways and Routers | AI data flows; APIs; inference endpoints (traffic side); model registries and dataset sources | |
| AI Model | Models; Algorithms (model configuration) | |
| Runtime AI Data | Prompts (runtime); inference data | |
| AI Agent Identities | Agents as autonomous principals; Keys; Integrations and permissions | |
| CSA AI Controls Matrix | AI Orchestration Tools | Application and Interface Security; Supply Chain Management |
| AI Gateways and Routers | Infrastructure Security; Interoperability and Portability | |
| AI Model | Model Security; Governance, Risk and Compliance | |
| Runtime AI Data | Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management; Application and Interface Security | |
| AI Agent Identities | IAM; Governance, Risk and Compliance | |
| ISO 42001 | AI Orchestration Tools | A.6 AI system life cycle; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems |
| AI Gateways and Routers | A.8 Information for interested parties; A.9 Use of AI systems; A.10 Third-party and customer relationships | |
| AI Model | A.6 AI system life cycle; A.10 Third-party and customer relationships; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems | |
| Runtime AI Data | A.7 Data for AI systems; A.8 Information for interested parties | |
| AI Agent Identities | A.9 Use of AI systems; A.3 Internal organization; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems | |
| Google SAIF | AI Orchestration Tools | Secure the AI supply chain; application and pipeline security; agent orchestration controls |
| AI Gateways and Routers | Harden and monitor infrastructure; network-level access and egress controls | |
| AI Model | Protect the AI model; ensure model integrity, provenance, and weight security | |
| Runtime AI Data | Expand AI red-teaming; runtime input and output safety; prompt defense | |
| AI Agent Identities | Focus on Agents (explicit SAIF section); identity, authorization, and delegation controls | |
| SANS Critical AI Security Guidelines | AI Orchestration Tools | Secure Agentic Systems and AI Autonomy Controls (defined function scope; execution isolation; API and function-call gating); Limit Model Behavior (focused functionality; access controls outside the model) |
| AI Gateways and Routers | Conventional Security Controls (authenticate and control access to inference APIs; API key management); Model I/O Handling (rate limiting; egress output filtering); Monitoring (interaction and API-usage logging) | |
| AI Model | Conventional Security Controls (protect model parameters with least privilege, encryption at rest, runtime obfuscation, and trusted execution environments); Data/Model Engineering Controls (adversarial training; alignment and fine-tuning); AI Supply Chain Management (public-model caution; transfer-attack exposure) | |
| Runtime AI Data | Model I/O Handling (sanitize, validate, and filter inputs and outputs; segregate user and system prompts; multilayered prompt-injection defense); Conventional Security Controls (protect augmentation and RAG data with vector-store access controls and validation); Data Minimization and Obfuscation (limit sensitive prompt content; context-window management); Limit Model Behavior (AI guardrails) | |
| AI Agent Identities | Secure Agentic Systems and AI Autonomy Controls (defined function scope; API and function-call gating; escalation and fallback); Limit Model Behavior (least-privilege focused functionality; human oversight; override capabilities) | |
| MITRE ATLAS | AI Orchestration Tools | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection; AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak; AML.T0016 Obtain Capabilities (malicious plugins) |
| AI Gateways and Routers | AML.T0057 LLM Data Leakage; AML.T0024 Exfiltration via AI Inference API (network-side observation) | |
| AI Model | AML.T0043 Craft Adversarial Data; AML.T0024 Exfiltration via AI Inference API (subtechniques: AML.T0024.001 Invert AI Model and AML.T0024.002 Extract AI Model); AML.T0018 Manipulate AI Model (integrity and backdoor) | |
| Runtime AI Data | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection; AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak; AML.T0056 Extract LLM System Prompt | |
| AI Agent Identities | AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation; credential and delegation-chain abuse | |
| OWASP AI Exchange | AI Orchestration Tools | Development-time threats: agent framework supply chain; runtime threats: plugin abuse, prompt injection via tools |
| AI Gateways and Routers | Runtime threats: data leakage via AI egress; network-level access control gaps | |
| AI Model | Development-time and runtime model threats: model inversion, extraction, evasion, poisoning | |
| Runtime AI Data | Input threats: prompt injection, adversarial inputs, evasion; runtime threats: RAG poisoning, memory tampering | |
| AI Agent Identities | Runtime threats: unauthorized agent actions, capability abuse, delegation chain exploitation | |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 | AI Orchestration Tools | LLM01 Prompt Injection; LLM05 Improper Output Handling; LLM07 System Prompt Leakage; LLM10 Unbounded Consumption |
| AI Gateways and Routers | LLM10 Unbounded Consumption (cost and rate control); shadow AI egress and output handling | |
| AI Model | LLM03 Supply Chain; LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning; LLM09 Misinformation | |
| Runtime AI Data | LLM01 Prompt Injection; LLM02 Sensitive Information Disclosure; LLM08 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses; LLM05 Improper Output Handling | |
| AI Agent Identities | LLM06 Excessive Agency; LLM05 Improper Output Handling; unauthorized actions by AI agents | |
| OWASP Agentic Security Top 10 | AI Orchestration Tools | ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation; ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE); ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication; ASI08 Cascading Failures; ASI10 Rogue Agents |
| AI Gateways and Routers | ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation (egress and tool-invocation scope); ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (MCP and tool-registry trust) | |
| AI Model | ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (model provenance, weights, and dynamic loading) | |
| Runtime AI Data | ASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning; ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack (via prompt injection in runtime inputs) | |
| AI Agent Identities | ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse; ASI10 Rogue Agents; ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation (when tied to agent permissions) |
Provenance
Last sourced 2026-07-27.
Expand Collapse
Sources
- Rethinking AI Risk with JetStream
- “Build your AI action plan with JetStream, now FedRAMP High certified.”
- JetStream Announces Verified MCP Governance Layer for Enterprise AI Agents
- “It gives enterprises a unified control point over MCP and large language model traffic, including authentication, authorization, policy enforcement, and content inspection before and after each call.”
- Security-First AI Governance Platform
- “An AI Blueprint™ is a living operational contract that defines approved models, tools, identities, guardrails, and ownership for an AI workflow.”
- “JetStream binds agents, service accounts, and model usage to a provable human owner through the Identity Broker™, ensuring every AI action is attributable and revocable.”
- “It enforces operational and security guardrails, records evidence, and flags drift”
Changelog
-
Extended matrix coverage with two additional rows.
-
Corrected matrix coverage (erratum): added a function to one row.
-
Added to the catalog from the JetStream Security platform documentation.
Found an error? Corrections are welcome. Suggest an edit.