Immuta
Overview
Product details compiled from public sources, each with a citation.
Matrix Coverage
Where this product defends, by asset class and NIST CSF function. The Coverage column shows whether each asset is Primary, Secondary, or Adjacent to what the product does. The table omits empty rows and columns.
| Asset class | Identify | Protect | Detect | Coverage | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Training Data | Primary | 2 | |||
| AI Agent Identities | Identify: Not covered | Detect: Not covered | Secondary | 1 |
Framework Relevance
These frameworks include controls relevant to the asset classes Immuta defends. This is an editorial inference from the AI Defense Matrix asset-level crossmap, not a statement that Immuta implements these controls or is certified against them.
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| Framework | Asset class | Relevant controls |
|---|---|---|
| NIST IR 8596 | Training Data | Training data |
| AI Agent Identities | Agents as autonomous principals; Keys; Integrations and permissions | |
| CSA AI Controls Matrix | Training Data | Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management; Model Security |
| AI Agent Identities | IAM; Governance, Risk and Compliance | |
| ISO 42001 | Training Data | A.7 Data for AI systems |
| AI Agent Identities | A.9 Use of AI systems; A.3 Internal organization; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems | |
| Google SAIF | Training Data | Secure training data; data-security foundations; dataset provenance and integrity |
| AI Agent Identities | Focus on Agents (explicit SAIF section); identity, authorization, and delegation controls | |
| SANS Critical AI Security Guidelines | Training Data | Conventional Security Controls (defend training data; avoid data commingling); Data/Model Engineering Controls (data-quality controls; poison-robust training); Data Minimization and Obfuscation (differential privacy; synthetic data; federated learning) |
| AI Agent Identities | Secure Agentic Systems and AI Autonomy Controls (defined function scope; API and function-call gating; escalation and fallback); Limit Model Behavior (least-privilege focused functionality; human oversight; override capabilities) | |
| MITRE ATLAS | Training Data | AML.T0020 Poison Training Data; AML.T0019 Publish Poisoned Datasets; AML.T0024.000 Infer Training Data Membership |
| AI Agent Identities | AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation; credential and delegation-chain abuse | |
| OWASP AI Exchange | Training Data | Development-time threats: data poisoning, backdoor injection, dataset integrity violations |
| AI Agent Identities | Runtime threats: unauthorized agent actions, capability abuse, delegation chain exploitation | |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 | Training Data | LLM04 Data and Model Poisoning; LLM03 Supply Chain (dataset provenance) |
| AI Agent Identities | LLM06 Excessive Agency; LLM05 Improper Output Handling; unauthorized actions by AI agents | |
| OWASP Agentic Security Top 10 | Training Data | ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (dataset provenance and integrity) |
| AI Agent Identities | ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse; ASI10 Rogue Agents; ASI09 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation (when tied to agent permissions) |
Provenance
Last sourced 2026-06-09.
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Sources
- Immuta Agentic Data Access
- “Whether you add 1 agent or 100, they all automatically follow the same enterprise guardrails without a single additional database role being manually created.”
- Immuta Data Security for AI
- “Unifying data discovery, policy enforcement, activity monitoring, and auditing in a single, integrated plane makes it easy to mitigate risk without slowing the pace of AI innovation.”
Changelog
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Enriched from the Immuta data security documentation.
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