Corridor
Overview
Product details compiled from public sources, each with a citation.
- Vendor
- Corridor Security3
- Description
- Secures AI-generated code at generation through an MCP server and agent hooks in Cursor, Claude Code, and Copilot, plus automated PR security reviews and org-wide AI-code visibility.3
- Deployment
- SaaS1
- Status
- Active3
- Compliance
- SOC 2 Type I2 (company-level, see Methodology)
Matrix Coverage
Where this product defends, by asset class and NIST CSF function. The Coverage column shows whether each asset is Primary, Secondary, or Adjacent to what the product does. The table omits empty rows and columns.
| Asset class | Identify | Protect | Detect | Coverage | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI Orchestration Tools | Protect: Not covered | Secondary | 3 | ||
| AI-Generated Code | Primary | 3 |
Framework Relevance
These frameworks include controls relevant to the asset classes Corridor defends. This is an editorial inference from the AI Defense Matrix asset-level crossmap, not a statement that Corridor Security implements these controls or is certified against them.
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| Framework | Asset class | Relevant controls |
|---|---|---|
| NIST IR 8596 | AI Orchestration Tools | Agents as deployed artifacts (orchestration view; see AI Agent Identities row for the principal view); system prompts and templates |
| CSA AI Controls Matrix | AI Orchestration Tools | Application and Interface Security; Supply Chain Management |
| AI-Generated Code | Application and Interface Security; Supply Chain Management | |
| ISO 42001 | AI Orchestration Tools | A.6 AI system life cycle; A.5 Assessing impacts of AI systems |
| AI-Generated Code | A.6 AI system life cycle | |
| Google SAIF | AI Orchestration Tools | Secure the AI supply chain; application and pipeline security; agent orchestration controls |
| AI-Generated Code | Secure the AI pipeline; code provenance and supply chain integrity | |
| SANS Critical AI Security Guidelines | AI Orchestration Tools | Secure Agentic Systems and AI Autonomy Controls (defined function scope; execution isolation; API and function-call gating); Limit Model Behavior (focused functionality; access controls outside the model) |
| AI-Generated Code | Model I/O Handling (AI deployment in IDEs: prefer local-only integrations to limit exposure of code, keys, and proprietary data); Governance, Risk, Compliance (regularly test and red-team AI applications before and after deployment) | |
| MITRE ATLAS | AI Orchestration Tools | AML.T0051 LLM Prompt Injection; AML.T0054 LLM Jailbreak; AML.T0016 Obtain Capabilities (malicious plugins) |
| AI-Generated Code | AML.T0010 AI Supply Chain Compromise (hallucinated dependencies and slopsquatting); AML.T0018 Manipulate AI Model (when models embed code-execution backdoors) | |
| OWASP AI Exchange | AI Orchestration Tools | Development-time threats: agent framework supply chain; runtime threats: plugin abuse, prompt injection via tools |
| AI-Generated Code | Development-time threats: insecure code generation, license risk, hallucinated dependencies | |
| OWASP LLM Top 10 | AI Orchestration Tools | LLM01 Prompt Injection; LLM05 Improper Output Handling; LLM07 System Prompt Leakage; LLM10 Unbounded Consumption |
| AI-Generated Code | LLM06 Excessive Agency (code execution); insecure or vulnerable code patterns inherited from training data | |
| OWASP Agentic Security Top 10 | AI Orchestration Tools | ASI01 Agent Goal Hijack; ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation; ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE); ASI07 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication; ASI08 Cascading Failures; ASI10 Rogue Agents |
| AI-Generated Code | ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution (RCE); ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (hallucinated dependencies and vibe-coding artifacts) |
Provenance
Last sourced 2026-06-24.
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Sources
- Corridor documentation
- Corridor Trust Center
- “Corridor SOC 2 Type I 04.01.26.pdf”
- Corridor
- “Corridor’s MCP server and agent hooks integrate directly with your coding tools, preventing vulnerabilities before they’re even written.”
- “Monitor MCP servers and security policy violations”
Changelog
-
Added to the catalog from the Corridor documentation.
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